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$EVWUDFW
This report is a part of a study of the potential for the EU to take on leadership in the climate
negotiations. The aim of this part is to sort out factors that may explain the different economic
interests in cutting CO2-emissions within the EU. It is based on the idea that interests occur as
a result of different perception of the cost of emission cuts among stakeholders. Sector-based
comparisons of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom indicate
that the conflicts resulting from an announcement of emission cuts are likely to be moderate in
Germany, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, while the possibility for conflicts in France,
Italy and Spain are significantly higher. The explanation can to a large extent be found by the
possibilities for reducing emissions in the electricity sector.
The differences facing the different countries when it comes to emission cuts might explain
why the EU has not succeeded in implementing common measures across the member
countries. To prepare for a common policy, a co-ordination of the electricity market should be
given priority. Meanwhile, the differentiation of targets agreed upon after Kyoto clearly
contributes to mitigate conflicts. On the other hand, new conflicts may occur as a result. The
present analysis points out that Italy has got very strict targets compared with the other
countries, while the targets for the Netherlands and Spain are moderate.
The project has been financed by the EU and by the Norwegian Research Council.
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
According to the Kyoto protocol from December 1997, the EU should commit itself to reduce
their emissions of greenhouse gases by 8 percent on average over the period 2008 to 2012,
compared with 1990. Considering the potential of low-cost measures to reduce greenhouse
gases available in the EU, the chance of fulfilling this target is considered to be relatively
good. However, the required efforts needed to succeed vary greatly among member countries,
even though the internal differentiation of emission cuts within EU reduces the obstacles
considerably. Still, a lot of problems remain. These relate inter alia to the monitoring and
reporting of emissions, particularly of greenhouse gases other than CO2, procedures for
reporting cross-national activities such as activities implemented jointly and trading of quotas,
and not least to the responsibility for the achievement of the targets.
These problems are of course not ‘EU-specific’. They apply to the implementation of the
Kyoto protocol in general, and represent larger challenges when considering all Annex B
countries than the challenges faced internally by the EU. Existing institutions and political
infrastructure of the EU facilitates a solution to these problems. EU has thereby got a ‘flying
start’ when it comes to the management of diverging interests among countries arising from
the commitments of the Kyoto protocol on a global scale. If the EU manage to deal with the
problems satisfactorily and succeeds in implementing the policy internally, they have an
opportunity to ‘set an example’ for the global implementation of the treaty, and thereby
perform directional leadership.
The obstacles for a successful climate policy, globally as well as within the EU, are closely
related to conflicts of interests among countries and among stakeholders within countries. The
ability to solve these problems depends partly on the extent of these conflicts and partly on the
competence of the institutions responsible for the implementation of the policy. A premise for
the EU to perform directional leadership is that the conflicts of interests are portrayed and
well understood and that adequate institutions, measures and instruments are present. This
paper highlights potential conflicts that may occur as a result of the anticipated economic
consequences of cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. It is recognised, though, that conflicting
interests cannot be considered independent of the institutional framework, nor that conflicts
may arise due to other than economic factors. In particular, the choice of instruments and
measures constitutes a considerable potential for both increasing and mitigating the potential
conflicts.
An example of how significant economic factors may be for the choice of climate policy was
demonstrated by EU’s proposal of internal differentiation of emission cuts prior to the Kyoto
meeting. The proposal was based on the so-called Triptych approach, which emphasises
expected economic growth, energy intensive industry’s share of total industrial output and on
the characteristics of the energy supply system, such as the content of nuclear power (Ringius,
1999)
In this paper, we study similar characteristics of EU countries to portray the different
economic interests within and among countries. The analysis is based on the idea that
emission cuts represent a potential cost to industries and individuals. Whether the proposed
cuts are accepted or repelled depends on how large these costs are expected to be. We discuss
two aspects of the expected costs. First, we assess the expected increase in the cost of
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production or consumption resulting from a given carbon tax. Second, we discuss on an
informal basis the possibilities for implementing new technologies and thereby saving energy
within sectors, or to reduce emissions of other greenhouse gases. These possibilities may be
considered as the availability of options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions not necessarily
invoked by taxes. The analysis provides a basis for studying possible internal and external
conflicts. The cost of restructuring the economy as a result of carbon cuts is analysed by a
demand scheme showing the cost facing different sectors of the economy as a consequence of
a carbon tax. The ability to restructure the economy is further analysed by a general discussion
of available options in different sectors to reduce emissions of CO2, save energy, or to reduce
the emissions of other greenhouse gases than CO2.
The paper examines six EU-countries, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and
United Kingdom. These countries cover nearly 85 percent of EU’s total population and more
than 85 percent of the CO2-emissions. They also reflect typical views on environmental policy
issues represented in the EU. In the context of climate policy, Ringius (1999) divide the EU
countries into three categories: The ‘green and rich’ countries, the ‘not so green, but rich’
countries, and the ‘less rich’ countries. Among the first ones, we find Germany and the
Netherlands. France, Italy and United Kingdom belong to the second category, while Spain is
in the third.
Section 2 presents the methodological basis for the study. The six country studies are
presented in section 3. Section 4 compares the results for the different countries. Potential
external and internal conflicts of interests are discussed, and possible ways to mitigate the
conflicts are considered. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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 0HWKRGRORJ\
 0HDVXUHVDQGLQVWUXPHQWV
To identify the costs of developing and implementing a climate policy, one needs to define the
potential of relevant measures and instruments. Analyses of climate policies traditionally
distinguish between direct and indirect instruments. Direct instruments comprise regulations,
public investments, laws, standards, etc. while indirect instruments comprise economic
instruments, such as charges of taxes.
Measures to be used as direct instruments in climate policy are usually analysed by means of a
bottom-up approach with a relatively detailed specification of the technologies of alternative
options.1 Bottom-up studies are useful when surveying the potential of new alternative
technologies and for studies of direct instruments. The economic evaluation of measures in
such studies is usually done by traditional cost-benefit analysis, based on observed prices.
The best way to study the effect of economic instruments, which aim at reallocating resources
by changes in relative prices, is by macroeconomic top-down models.2  There are tendencies
towards drawing a borderline between the approaches in saying that bottom-up analyses
favour the use of direct measures, while top-down studies favour taxes and charges. This
borderline is, however, not at all clear. Both kinds of instruments may be analysed within both
analytical approaches. This is the view taken in this paper, where we develop a demand
scheme for fossil fuels based on a top-down approach and discuss measures sector by sector
from a general ‘bottom-up’ point of view.
In mixing the two approaches we may hope to draw the advantage of both, but we also run the
risk of comprising the weaknesses of both. In particular, there is a chance of leaving out
important options, or to count them twice. To try to keep track of this problem, a discussion of
how technologies are represented in bottom-up and in top-down models may be useful.
Bottom-up studies aim at evaluating new technologies by identifying and describing them in
terms of energy effectiveness and usage, often in great detail. The studies emphasise
technological characteristics, and require substantial insight in energy engineering. The
detailed description of the technologies allows for assessments of the costs of implementation,
based on observable cost components, and for assessments of benefits, e.g. in terms of value
of saved energy and/or a valuation of reduced emissions.
In top-down models the technology is represented by estimated production functions for an
aggregate of enterprises and technologies. The production functions are chosen under the
assumptions of general properties important for economic decision making, and parameterised
by means of observations for a year or for a period of time. It is impossible to identify specific
technologies in such a model. For instance, one cannot say whether or not the potential for an
introduction of heat pumps in public buildings is utilised. If based on time series data, the
aggregate production function will, however, include observed technological change during
                                                     
1
 See e.g. COHERENCE (1991), UNEP (1994), Kram and Hill (1996) and Grubb et al. (1993)
2
 See e.g. Nordhaus (1993), Manne and Richels (1991), Peck and Teisberg (1994), Oliveira-Martins et al. (1993),
Dean (1993), Edmonds and Barns (1992).
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the observation period. The answer as to whether heat pumps are included is ‘yes’ if heat
pumps represent a natural ‘prolongation’ of technologies introduced within the time
perspective and range of relative prices of the study, and ‘no’ if not.
The advantage of top-down models is that they enable studies of changes in relative prices. In
particular, they apply for studies of the consequences of a carbon tax. Such studies are
important in assessments of the national cost of climate policies for two reasons. Firstly,
although taxes are unlikely to be implemented on a common basis for the EU, it may
constitute a vital part of single countries’ climate policy. Secondly, taxes at least on CO2
emissions, can be interpreted as the social cost of emission cuts. Even though the
representation of alternative technologies in top-down models is vague, the analysis of taxes
therefore provides important and necessary information about social costs.
A graphical illustration of how technologies are represented in the two approaches is given in
figure 2.1. The [-axis measures the input of energy, causing emissions, to the production of a
commodity aggregate, \. The [-axis measures the input of other commodities, which causes
no emissions of greenhouse gases. The production technology described in a macroeconomic
model is represented by an iso-curve \, along which combinations of [ and [ produce exactly
the same quantity of output. At a given set of prices, the production cost represent a straight
line for which combinations of [ and [ result in the same costs, &  =  S[S[. The
combination of [ and [ that minimises the cost of producing \ is the point at which the \-
curve and the &-line are tangent to each other, that is point $.
)LJXUH,OOXVWUDWLRQRIWRSGRZQDQGERWWRPXSVWXGLHVRIHPLVVLRQFXWV
The slope of the cost curve depends on the prices of [ and [. An increase in the price of [
relative to the price of [ makes the slope of the cost curve steeper. The cost minimising
combination of [ and [ thereby shift to point % The resulting reduction in emissions,
indicated by the change in [, is critically dependent on the shape of the iso-curve \. Since the
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parameterisation of top-down models is usually based on observations, one may argue that it
is unlikely that new technologies are captured by the iso-curve \ Moreover, there may be
adequate available measures not initiated by taxes. These are certainly not included. This
applies, for example, to a large extent to measures directed against other emissions than CO2
(Aaheim, 1998). One may therefore argue that the \-curve is too conservative and that it
should be replaced by an alternative iso-curve that embeds new technologies, \W, and hence
that point %should be placed further to the left, to %W
To analyse the perspectives of both the bottom-up approach and the top-down approach, we
divide the study of each country into two parts in this report. First, a partial analysis of the
cost of reducing carbon emissions by sector is carried out by means of a demand scheme
presented below. The demand scheme helps us find the demand driven effect on the
production cost of a carbon tax. This ‘cost push’ will be interpreted as the anticipated cost of a
given cut in emissions initiated by taxes. Next, we discuss alternative ways to cut emissions
by reducing energy demand, apply alternative technologies or to cut other greenhouse gases.
The availability of alternatives differs strongly from sector to sector, and even within sectors.
The discussion of alternative ways to adapt to a carbon tax will be based on fairly general
characteristics of each sector. These characteristics are pointed out in section 2.3.
It must be emphasised that this two-step approach is not methodologically consistent. A full
top-down model would analyse how a tax affects equilibrium prices. Instead, we interpret the
demand driven cost-push of a tax as an indicator of how costly a given reduction in emissions
is expected to be. The choice of parameters in the demand scheme (or curvature of the iso-
curve \) assesses in principle the options discussed on a sector basis. However, a lot of
informal, but useful, information is lost by aggregation of technologies. An ad hoc discussion
of options sector by sector may provide a better foundation for portraying the problems of
implementing climate policy than a full top-down analysis, with its limited representation of
policy measures and options.
 $VFKHPHIRUWKHDQDO\VLVRIHQHUJ\GHPDQGE\VHFWRU
The aim of the demand scheme is to provide an indication of the costs of imposing a carbon
tax. The general idea is that a carbon tax affects the prices of coal, oil and gas differently
according to the carbon content of energy. Hence, the demand for fossil fuels will tend to
increase for gas, which has the lowest content and thereby the lowest tax, at the expense of oil
and coal. However use of fossil fuels may be substituted by electricity, and the substitution
between fossil fuels and electricity also depends on how electricity is affected by the tax. This
depends on the level of input of fossil fuels in the electricity sector. Energy is an aggregate of
fossil fuels and electricity, and may be substituted by other commodities. Again, the
substitution depends on the carbon content both in energy and in the other input. Hence, the
carbon tax has a series of effects through the whole economy, before we can say what the cost
eventually is to a sector or to the nation.
The structure of the demand scheme for fossil fuels is shown in figure 2.2. The economy is
divided into four sectors: production of commodities, production of services (including
transport), production of electricity and households. The demand for fossil fuels in each sector
is found by ‘nesting’ the demand for sub-groups of commodity aggregates: The output from
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the service sector and the commodity sector is modelled as a function of input of labour and
energy. Energy is ‘produced’ by fossil energy and electricity, and fossil energy is the product
of input of coal, oil and gas. The demand for energy in households has a similar structure,
with the exception that total consumption is ‘produced’ by energy and other commodities and
services.
)LJXUH'HPDQGVFKHPHIRUIRVVLOIXHOV
Fossil fuels
Output
Coal Oil Gas
Labour
ELECTRICITY SECTOR
Fossil fuels
Consumption
Coal Oil Gas
Electricity
HOUSEHOLDS
Energy Commodities
and services
Fossil fuels
Output
Coal Oil Gas
Electricity
COMMODITY SECTOR AND SERVICE SE CTOR
Energy Labour
The input of energy to the electricity sector consists only of fossil fuels in the model. In
addition, supply of electricity may be provided by other energy sources, such as nuclear power
or hydro-power. These sources are not explicitly included in the demand scheme, since they
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are considered to be unaffected by a carbon tax. In countries where a large part of the
electricity supply is based on other sources, such as France, the price of electricity is therefore
relatively insensitive to a carbon tax. The immediate push in costs caused by a carbon tax is
therefore relatively small. On the other hand, the emission intensity in the over-all economy is
low because of the large amount of nuclear power. As a result, substitution towards less
emission intensive demand is more expensive than in economies with coal-based electricity.
The characteristics of each sector are specified by the choice of parameters in the demand
scheme. Technically, it is assumed that the generation of each commodity is described by a
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) technology. This means that the percent reduction in
relative input of two factors resulting from one percent increase in their relative prices is the
same, regardless of on the composition of the two factors. The elasticity of substitution is
chosen by assumption. We use the same elasticity for all countries to facilitate a comparison
of the various possibilities on the supply side within the same sectors across countries. The
characteristics of sectors within a country are captured by the parameters describing the
distribution of input. These parameters are calibrated by national accounts data for 1994. The
chosen set of elasticity of substitution at the different levels is shown in table 2.1.
7DEOH(ODVWLFLW\RIVXEVWLWXWLRQE\VHFWRU$OOFRXQWULHV
6HFWRU )RVVLOIXHOV (QHUJ\ 2XWSXW
(OHFWULFLW\ 0.625 - 0.588
&RPPRGLWLHV 0.714 0.909 0.800
6HUYLFHV 0.500 0.444 0.980
+RXVHKROGV 0.909 0.909 0.645
1) Output is total consumption
The elasticity of substitution among fossil fuels is generally assumed to be low (little
flexibility), except for households, which is assumed to have a potential for flexibility in
heating. Also the service sector uses a relatively large share of their fossil fuels to space
heating, but this sector also includes the transport sectors, which is more or less determined to
oil. The flexibility in the service sector is therefore assumed to be low. The energy demand is
assumed to be flexible except for the service sector, for which the transport sector again limits
the opportunities. In the electricity sector it is assumed that the opportunities for substituting
electricity by other inputs, here labour, are small. The opportunities for substituting energy by
labour are greater in the commodities and service sectors. Finally, households are not
expected to be able to substitute energy by other commodities easily.
The purpose of the demand schemes is to find how sensitive the demand for fossil fuels is to
carbon taxes. These are found by imposing a carbon tax on the use of fossil fuels to obtain a
10 percent reduction in CO2 emissions. The measures we use are supposed to indicate how
costly an implementation of cuts in the emissions of CO2 is anticipated to be to the different
sectors. Note, however, that the effects found by the demand scheme are based on a ‘myopic’
view on the effects of a tax on costs, since market effects of the tax are disregarded. We use
two indicators to analyse this cost:
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• 7KHFRVWSXVKLQGLFDWRU tells how much the unit production cost in a sector increases by a
given reduction in national CO2 emissions, achieved by a carbon tax. This cost depends on
the composition of fossil fuels in the final input and on the ability to substitute towards
input with lower emissions. The indicator thus gives the elasticity of costs with respect to
national carbon cuts.
• 7KHDQWLFLSDWHGXQLWFRVWRIHPLVVLRQUHGXFWLRQV is the cost-push per unit of reduced CO2
emissions. These vary across sectors in the analysis, while in an equilibrium model, they
would all be the same. Hence, they indicate which sectors might have to abate more than
indicated by the reduction in energy demand from a tax, and which sectors might have to
reduce less. Alternatively, they indicate in what sectors a myopic view on taxes
exaggerates the final costs, and in what sectors a myopic view underestimates them.
In studying attitudes towards instruments and measures in climate policy, the anticipated unit
cost of emission reductions may explain differences in attitudes across sectors. A high
anticipated unit costs implies incentives to find less costly ways to reduce emissions, e.g. by
trying out non-conventional technologies. A low anticipated unit cost means that the sector
will probably insist on free quotas instead of taxes, since they are able to reduce emissions
more than average with ‘internal’ measures and still pay less than their cost-effective share
indicates. This applies in particular if the cost-push indicator is relatively high.
 2SSRUWXQLWLHVRQWKHVXSSO\VLGH
The change in energy prices eventually brought about by implementation of a carbon tax
depends on the characteristics of the production technologies, here called the supply side.
Different from macroeconomic models, this study bases the reactions on the supply side on an
ad hoc discussion of technological options in each sector. The aim of this discussion is to
explore how smoothly the supply side is able to adapt to emission taxes by application of new
technologies and a shift in the demand for energy. Sectors with little flexibility in this respect
may either try to avoid targets for their own sake, or suggest alternatives to a tax. The outcome
of this exercise is to point out sectors where conflicts are most likely to occur. The studies of
single countries will be based on a rather general discussion of options available in different
sectors. Below follows some characteristics of importance in such a discussion.
 7KHHOHFWULFLW\VHFWRU
The technologies applied for generating electricity are extremely important in an analysis of
options to reduce CO2 emissions, due to the huge contribution to total emissions from this
sector. Production of electricity in many of the countries studied is heavily based on coal or oil
and to some extent on nuclear power and gas. Countries with a high share of coal plants have
opportunities to switch towards energy types with lower emissions per produced kWh, such as
gas. The possibility of doing so depends partly on the availability of gas. The northern
countries are clearly better off than the southern countries in this respect. The Netherlands and
United Kingdom possess their own resources, and Germany is a node in the European gas
network.
The possibilities of extending the use of alternatives to fossil fuels may be important.
However, the opportunities are limited. Renewable energy is generally considered to be either
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fully exploited (hydro) or too expensive (wind, sun, waves etc), but major achievements may
be obtained in the future in bringing the costs of utilising new renewable energy down (Flavin
and Lenssen, 1994, Krause and Koomey, 1996). This may be important for the questions
studied in this paper if the potential varies among countries. It is difficult to say whether this
is the case, and possible consequences of an introduction of new renewable energy sources on
a large scale will not be emphasised in this study.
Use of biomass also represents an opportunity, not only to reduce emissions, but also to
stimulate sinks of CO2. Biomass fuel has, however, other local environmental disadvantages,
and to base energy supply on biomass may therefore be problematic. Another possibility is of
course nuclear power. In this study, we do not, however, consider nuclear power to be a
possible rescue for the EU in its efforts to succeed in climate policy.
The technologies of power plants across Europe differ, and the effectiveness of the plants
varies greatly. Variations in the emissions per produced kWh for different plants based on the
same fuel indicate that the technology is old. Co-generation of electricity is considered to be
one of the most promising means to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases from power plants.
The costs of replacing old technology by co-generation plants may in many cases be covered
by the benefits from an increase in the effectiveness of the energy use (Krause and Koomey,
1996), and thereby represents a no-regret option.
 7KHFRPPRGLW\VHFWRU
The commodity sector comprises manufacturing industry. This is a highly heterogeneous
sector for which a close examination of possible opportunities for energy saving is impossible
to carry out within the scope of this study. Since the main focus here is how the sector may
respond to emission targets, and how they consider the implementation of a carbon tax, we
will concentrate our discussion on a few general characteristics of the sector.
First, the contribution from energy intensive industries is important. These industries are
usually dominated by big enterprises with considerable political power. A combination of
political power and low-cost opportunities makes it unlikely that they are willing to accept
costly measures to reduce emissions. As a consequence, they are sceptical to taxes, because
energy represents a major cost component to them. A successful implementation of alternative
instruments requires, however, that the authorities are conscious of the effectiveness of the
alternatives. If alternative instruments are imposed to avoid conflicts with politically strong
interests, they are not likely to have sufficient real effect on the emissions, and consequently,
the reductions has to be carried out by others. This is not only ineffective from an economic
point of view, but also a source of conflict within countries as well as among countries.
Second, the extent to which other greenhouse gases than CO2 are emitted may be important
for the available options among measures and instruments. The Kyoto protocol regulates
emissions of methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride and
perfluorocarbons in addition to CO2.  Methane and nitrous oxide are emitted from industry,
agriculture and from waste deposits, while most of the emissions of the remaining three
greenhouse gases are related to industrial processes. Large emissions of these compounds
allow for a more flexible, and thereby a less controversial implementation of a climate policy.
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 7KHVHUYLFHVHFWRU
The two main utilities of energy use in the service sector are indoor heating or cooling of
commercial buildings and transport. Energy use per room volume in commercial and public
buildings is two to three times as high as energy use in households. Hence, the potential for
energy saving and for substitution among energy carriers is generally believed to be large.
However, it turns out to be very hard to reduce the energy use in the service sector. The
effectiveness of energy use in service buildings was significantly enhanced during the oil price
hikes in the 1970s and early 1980s. Today, the rate of growth in energy use is mostly related
to economic growth and business cycles. There are, however, a lot of new appliances that may
be utilised to reduce the energy use in buildings. These include more effective heating
systems, low-energy light bulbs and automatic control and regulation systems. Some of these
require relatively substantial investments, especially in old buildings. Hence, the introduction
of new technologies in the service sector may take time.
The transport sector relies mainly on oil. Although experiments with alternative engines are
continuously carried out, the dependency on oil in transport is expected to continue for a long
time. The possibility for substitution among energy carriers is therefore considered to be very
small. However, there is some potential for substitution between transport modes, such as car
transport and rail transport. This may indirectly lead to substitution between oil and electricity.
Also the energy effectiveness of engines will probably be enhanced in the future, but hardly
enough to avoid a substantial increase in the total use of energy for transport purposes.
For the sector at large, we consider the opportunities for reducing the emissions of CO2 to be
limited. However, these opportunities are probably better the less the transport activities
contribute to the whole sector. With some exceptions, the sector is characterised by many
relatively small units. This suggests that one emphasise incentives as policy instruments. The
potential for implementing no-regret options and to enhance energy effectiveness is
traditionally considered to be higher in small units than in large ones. Hence, the effect of
information may be positive in this sector.
 7KHKRXVHKROGVHFWRU
The household sector has many similarities with the service sector. However, the units are
smaller, and the demand for energy is probably more flexible in the household sector than in
the service sector. Hence, the possibilities for substitution and the potential of getting no-
regret options carried out are probably better. As for the service sector, incentives are likely to
be the most effective, but also information campaigns may be useful.
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 &RXQWU\VWXGLHV
This section presents country studies of France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and
United Kingdom. The country studies focus on sector interests, and conclude by suggesting
how these may affect national interests. The discussion is focused on the characteristics of
energy demand and CO2 emissions within each sector in the six countries. The demand shifts
are calculated on a basis of a carbon tax resulting in an immediate 10 percent reduction in CO2
emissions. Recall that only the effects of a tax on demand is considered, and the figures
should not be confused with the final cost of a 10 percent reduction in CO2 emissions.
As a point of reference for this discussion, table 3.1 shows the average energy- and emission
intensities3 for all the six countries together. Clearly, the electricity sector is vital for the
discussion of possible measures for climate policy in the countries included in this study. For
obvious reasons the energy intensity of the sector is very high, and the sector accounts for
more than 20 percent of total energy consumption. The CO2 emissions amount to about 30
percent of the emissions from this area.
7DEOH(QHUJ\DQGHPLVVLRQLQWHQVLWLHVIRUDOOVL[FRXQWULHV
7RWDO &RPPR
GLWLHV
6HUYLFHV (OHF
WULFLW\
+RXVH
KROGV
(QHUJ\LQWHQVLW\3-0UG
86'*'3
7.55 5.34 4.00 52.89 1.52
(PLVVLRQLQW0LOOW
&20UG86'*'3
0.46 0.30 0.27 4.66 0.07
6KDUHRI*'3SHUFHQW 100 32.9 64.2 2.9 78.1
6KDUHRIWRWDOHQHUJ\XVH
SHUFHQW
100 23.3 34.0 20.4 15.8
The energy intensities as well as the emission intensities in the commodity sectors are slightly
above the intensities in the service sectors. The emissions in the service sectors are, however,
higher than in the commodity sectors if related to the energy intensity. This is mainly because
the transport sector is included in the service sector.
It is difficult to compare the household sector with the other sectors of the economy.
However, energy consumption in households has some similarities with energy consumption
in the service sector, with transport and space heating as main purposes. However, the
composition of energy carriers on the two purposes is widely different. Moreover, space
heating is considerably more energy demanding in the service sector than in households.
Some of this difference may be explained by technical factors, but there are many unexplained
differences as well.
                                                     
3
 Energy use and CO2 emissions refer to economic activity, which is GDP for ‘total’, the sectors’ gross product in
commodities, services and electricity, and consumption level in households. Sources of nuclear energy (e.g.
energy content in uranium) are not included in the calculation of energy intensities in the electricity sector.
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 )UDQFH
France differs from the other countries by its electricity supply, for which approximately 75
percent is based on nuclear power. Both the energy intensity and the emission intensity of the
electricity sector are very low compared with the average. The low emission intensity in the
households is due to relatively high share of electricity in energy consumption, but we also
note that the energy intensity in households is lower than the average.
7DEOH0DLQLQGLFDWRUVIRU)UDQFH
7RWDO &RPPR
GLWLHV
6HUYLFHV (OHF
WULFLW\
+RXVH
KROGV
*'30UG86' 1235 382 827 25 976
(QHUJ\LQWHQVLW\3-*'3 5.26 4.80 4.20 11.58 0.91
(PLVVLRQLQW0LOOW
&2*'3
0.31 0.27 0.27 1.09 0.03
&RVWSXVKLQGLFDWRU 1.33 1.59 1.14 3.88 4.07
The cost-push indicator for households is calculated as the cost-push for total energy use, and cannot be
compared with the indicators for the other sectors.
The tax necessary to reduce CO2 emissions by 10 percent in France is somewhat lower than
the average. Because of the nuclear power, however, the cost-push indicator in the electricity
sector is relatively small. Compared with the other countries, the total use of coal is low in
France, except in the commodity sector, where coal contributes to a higher share of energy
consumption than in most of the other countries. Most of the non-nuclear power is generated
by coal. As shown in figure 3.1, a fair share of the emission reduction may therefore be
obtained by reduction in the use of coal in the electricity sector. Also in the commodity sector,
the demand for coal is reduced substantially. In total, most of the reductions of CO2 emissions
in France is divided between coal and oil. The reduction in the demand for oil is most
significant in the service sector, which does not use coal. We also note the household sector
reduces the use of gas as their main contribution to emission reductions. The reduction in the
use of gas is significant in all sectors, except for the electricity sector. The reason is that gas is
an important energy carrier in France, and that energy demand has to be reduced to reduce
CO2 emissions.
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)LJXUH&KDQJHLQWKHGHPDQGIRUHQHUJ\FRPPRGLWLHVE\VHFWRULQ)UDQFHDVD
UHVXOWRIDFDUERQWD[3-
The low tax to reduce emissions makes the cost-push indicator for France relatively low, that
is, 1.33 percent per 10 percent reduction in the demand for CO2 emissions. Due to the
importance of coal, the costs of electricity generation is the most affected product, but the
impact of the tax on the cost of electricity is much lower than in other countries. The
reduction in oil consumption in the service sector is relatively expensive, and makes this
sector more affected than the commodity sector. However, also the French commodity sector
suffers significantly from the emission cuts because the possibility of reducing emissions
indirectly by means of reducing electricity demand is limited. This limits the advantage of
substitution for the commodity sector.
The anticipated unit cost of emission reductions is about 0.47 USD per kg CO2, see figure 3.2.
The anticipated unit cost is lowest in the electricity sector, and highest in the service sector.
As mentioned earlier, this could be interpreted as a motivation for finding alternative
technologies to those traditionally included in the aggregate demand functions. Since these are
expected to be low in the service sector, it is more likely that the sector interests tend to be in
disfavour of climate measures. The commodity sector may probably underestimate the costs
of emission reductions, and should therefore search for alternatives to traditional measures.
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)LJXUH$QWLFLSDWHGXQLWFRVWRIFDUERQFXWVE\VHFWRU86'NJ&2
As mentioned, the opportunities on the supply side in the service sector are limited. For
France, this applies in particular because transport contributes to a large share of the total
activities of the service sector. The emissions from transport amounts to 35 percent of the
sector’s emissions, which is more than twice as much as for instance in Germany. Lower
emissions from the transport sector requires first and foremost more energy effective cars,
trains, planes and ships. Improvements are to be expected, but they will not change the
opportunities in France relative to that of other countries.
The technological options beyond those implemented by taxes depend inter alia on the
opportunities in various branches, particularly in the commodity sector. A closer study of sub-
sectors in the French industry is required to make such an assessment. One possibility is,
however, to reduce other gases than CO2. The emissions of other gases are relatively high, and
constitute approximately 25 percent of total emissions of greenhouse gases in France. France
contributes to 11 percent of EU’s total emissions of N2O, of which more than half comes from
the industry. The emissions of HFK and PFK are also large by European standards This may
open some opportunities in these industries.
To draw advantage of alternative technologies and reduction in emissions of other gases, the
industries may try to obtain free quotas instead of paying taxes for CO2 emissions. To achieve
this requires a relatively close contact between the authorities and businesses. This is of
course more urgent the higher the energy intensities of the enterprises are, and easier the larger
they are. The importance of the heavy industry may give an indication of the possibility of
obtaining alternative measures to taxes since the heavy industry usually fulfil this criteria. In
France, heavy industry contributes 60 percent of the CO2-emissions from the total industry
sector. This is low compared with other countries. Although there may be many opportunities
to reduce emissions at a lower cost than indicated by the demand scheme, France’s industry is
likely to have smaller opportunities than other countries.
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
Total Commodities Services Electricity
6HFWRU
8
6
'
N
J
10,0
&,&(525HSRUW
Sources of conflicts in climate policy within the EU: An economic analysis
20
 *HUPDQ\
Germany’s energy and emission patterns are, in contrast to France’s, heavily influenced by the
use of coal. Coal accounts for more than 80 percent of the energy input in the electricity
sector, and the energy and emission intensities are twice as high as the average intensities for
the six countries together. Also the households are relatively energy intensive, which is why
the total emissions from the household sector are high. However, the intensities in the two
production sectors are slightly below the average.
7DEOH0DLQLQGLFDWRUVIRU*HUPDQ\
7RWDO &RPPR
GLWLHV
6HUYLFHV (OHF
WULFLW\
+RXVH
KROGV
*'30UG86' 1753 666 1052 36 1262
(QHUJ\LQWHQVLW\3-*'3 7.86 4.88 3.89 112.26 1.99
(PLVVLRQLQW0LOOW
&2*'3
0.55 0.28 0.27 10.44 0.10
&RVWSXVKLQGLFDWRU 8.37 12.92 5.02 22.21 22.03
1) The cost-push indicator for households is calculated as the cost-push for total energy use, and cannot be
compared with the indicators for the other sectors.
Due to the dependency of coal, the tax level for Germany is relatively high. Although this
leads to a considerable change in the energy demand, the total cost-push of a tax is the highest
among the six economies. As a result of the tax, the demand for coal in the electricity sector is
reduced to such an extent that the demand for oil and gas increases (see figure 3.3). It must be
added that it is doubtful whether the demand for oil in the electricity sector will actually
increase, since there are small chances that new power plants will be based on oil in the
future.
In the commodity sector, the demand for oil is nearly unaffected as a result of the reduction in
coal demand, but the total contribution from the German industry to the emission cuts is
somewhat lower than usual for the countries studied here. On the other hand, households
contribute more than usual for the other countries. The reduction in the demand for electricity,
oil and gas in the household sector is approximately the same in terms of PJ, while the
reduction in the demand for coal contributes somewhat less.
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)LJXUH&KDQJHVLQWKHGHPDQGIRUHQHUJ\FRPPRGLWLHVE\VHFWRULQ*HUPDQ\DVD
UHVXOWRIDFDUERQWD[3-
The anticipated cost increase in the electricity sector is 22 percent, which, together with the
UK, is the highest among all the countries. The high cost-push for electricity leads to a high
cost-push also for energy in the commodity, service and household sectors. This is because the
prices of direct fossil input relative to electricity is affected only to limited extent, and the
cost-push of energy thereby becomes higher than the cost-push for electricity. Thus, if the
electricity sector mange to reduce emissions at lower costs than indicated by the macro
figures, the potential for reducing emissions all through the German economy is large.
The vital question is therefore how the electricity sector adapts to a tax. An important factor in
this context is the availability of alternative energy sources in Germany. Germany’s own
energy resources are practically speaking limited to coal, which is expensive. Hence, the
electricity sector may also have economic reasons beyond those pointed out here, to reduce
the demand for coal. In addition, Germany’s central position for the transfer of gas from the
North Sea and Russia, both geographically and economically, represents good opportunities
for utilising alternatives to coal. Germany plans for a more extensive use of gas, but a main
obstacle for a rapid expansion is the country’s own coal industry, which will suffer from such
a development. How the commodity sector reacts to a tax depends on the possibilities of
finding alternative, less emission intensive technologies. A considerable potential is clearly
represented by a rationalisation of the industry in the eastern region of the country.
Also for the service sector, the cost-push is in the higher range of the six countries studied. As
for all the countries, the emissions are reduced mainly by a reduction in the consumption of
oil. In Germany, the CO2 emissions from transport contribute approximately 16 percent of the
total emissions from the service sector. This is low compared with other countries. The
possibilities of find less costly measures to reduce the emissions by energy saving, more
efficient energy use in buildings etc. are likely to be good, since a large share of the energy
consumption in the service sector is used for stationary purposes.
The commodity sector faces the highest anticipated unit costs among the sectors in Germany.
This is due to a moderate energy intensity and relatively high costs-push, see figure 3.4.
Hence, the motivation for implementing measures in the commodity sector is high. The
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commodity sector also has an opportunity to reduce other gases than CO2, but these are less
obvious for Germany than for other countries, since CO2 emissions contribute to a relatively
large share of total greenhouse gas emissions.  The anticipated unit cost in the service sector is
low, which may make it difficult to motivate a search for alternative measures to meet
emission targets. Also the electricity sector faces a very low anticipated unit cost. This may
turn out as an obstacle for a reduction if the emissions from the German electricity sector.
)LJXUH$QWLFLSDWHGXQLWFRVWVE\VHFWRUIRU*HUPDQ\
To sum up, an immediate evaluation of costs facing Germany by CO2 emission cuts are large,
due to their huge emissions. However, the options for low cost reductions are many, first and
foremost by reducing the dependency of coal in the electricity sector. It is, however, important
for the German authorities to motivate the electricity sector to reduce its emissions. On the
other hand, the dependency of coal is also expensive for Germany, which uses a lot of high-
cost coal from domestic deposits. Also the commodity sector embeds many opportunities,
inter alia in the manufacturing industries in the former DDR. At the same time, these sectors
seem to have the highest motivation for implementing new efficient technologies.
Consequently, the potential conflicts resulting from climate policy targets are probably low.
 ,WDO\
The energy and emission intensities in Italy are low compared with the other countries in this
study. This applies in particular for the service sector and in the electricity sector.
Approximately 1/3 of the generation of electricity is based on hydro power. Gas contributes
about thirty percent of the energy use in the commodity sector, which is almost as much as in
the Netherlands. Oil contributes about 90 percent of the use of energy in the service sector.
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7DEOH0DLQLQGLFDWRUVIRU,WDO\
7RWDO &RPPR
GLWLHV
6HUYLFHV (OHF
WULFLW\
+RXVH
KROGV
*'30UG86' 1127 3955 3812 173 4642
(QHUJ\LQWHQVLW\3-*'3 5.86 5.18 2.85 17.84 1.32
(PLVVLRQLQW0LOOW
&2*'3
0.36 0.28 0.19 2.06 0.07
&RVWSXVKLQGLFDWRU 3.28 4.11 2.32 11.87 12.48
1) The cost-push indicator for households is calculated as the cost-push for total energy use, and cannot be
compared with the indicators for the other sectors
The total cost-push of a carbon tax is higher than in Germany, Netherlands and Spain, but
lower than in Germany and in the UK. However, due to Italy’s high content of gas in the fossil
fuel aggregate and low emission intensities, the cost-push of fossil fuels is relatively high. In
the commodity sector and service sector, it is the highest among the countries studied here. In
the electricity sector, the possibilities of substitution towards less emission intensive
production are limited because electricity is largely based on oil and gas.
Figure 3.5 shows the change in the demand for energy commodities across sectors as a result
of a carbon tax. The limited contribution from the electricity sector is noted. The main
reductions have to be taken in the service sector, where oil contributes to most of the
reductions, and from the commodity sector, where gas takes the main part of the reductions.
This is true also for the household sector. The total reduction in the demand for energy
carriers in Italy is therefore related to oil and gas. This partly explains why the cost of
emission cuts turns out to be high. In addition, reductions that follows from the drop in the
demand for electricity is expensive because of the limited flexibility of the sector.
)LJXUH&KDQJHLQGHPDQGIRUHQHUJ\FRPPRGLWLHVE\VHFWRULQ,WDO\DVDUHVXOWRID
FDUERQWD[3-
Because of the importance of the electricity sector, the options beyond those described by the
demand scheme should be analysed. Figure 3.6 indicates that the sector has high incentives to
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search for alternative technologies. Two third of the fuel consumption in the electricity sector
consist of oil. Oil is expensive, and a substitution to gas in Italy’s power generating industry
may be both cost efficient and reduce the emissions of CO2. However, the potential for cutting
emissions by substituting toward gas is much lower than in coal fired plants. The possibility
of enhanced use of gas also depends on Italy’s availability of gas. Gas reserves are limited
within their own borders. Being close to North Africa the potential of buying new gas at low
prices is, however, good, but perhaps politically difficult. An extension of the gas trade
between Africa and Europe may also be advantageous to Italy by strengthening its role as a
transmission country.
Taking into consideration the low contribution to total costs from electricity, the anticipated
unit costs in the commodity and service sector are high compared with other countries. This
may give Italian enterprises incentives to find new ways of reducing emissions, for instance by
new and unconventional technologies, compared with similar sectors in other countries. The
contribution to CO2 emissions from the heavy industry is relatively high. In many cases, there
are more available options for reducing the emission intensity in heavy industry than in other
activities. This may contribute to make it easier to implement alternative measures to taxes, if
the heavy industry is well organised and have close relations with the authorities. Within the
service sector, the opportunities seem to be more limited, especially because transport
contributes to a high share of the CO2 emissions from this sector. The emissions of methane
are among the largest of the six countries. A relatively small share of these emissions is
related to fuels, and may represent additional opportunities for reduction of the emissions of
greenhouse gases from waste and agriculture. The emissions of nitrous oxide is on the
average, while emissions of the other greenhouse gases, HFK, PFK and SF6 are negligible.
)LJXUH$QWLFLSDWHGXQLWFRVWVE\VHFWRUIRU,WDO\
According to the demand scheme, the costs of adapting to cuts in emissions of CO2 are high in
Italy. This is mainly because the electricity sector is expensive and inflexible with respect to
emissions. Other factors that may support scepticism towards a radical policy to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, is the fact that Italy already uses a lot of gas, and has a relatively
low energy intensity compared with other countries. The households already use a lot of gas,
and emission cuts will to a large extent require reductions in the total energy demand. The
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possibilities of utilising alternative technologies seem to be limited, and, except for the case of
methane, the same applies for measures to reduce emissions of other gases than CO2.
 7KH1HWKHUODQGV
Energy use in the Netherlands is characterised by a huge share of gas, which constitutes 45
percent of the total energy use. Gas is the major energy commodity in all sectors except for
services, where 65 percent is oil-based. However, even the service sector exhibits a low share
of oil compared with the other countries.
The importance of gas in the Netherlands’ energy consumption is of course due to their gas
reserves. The price of gas has been kept at a low level, and this may explain why the energy
intensity is nearly three times as high in the Netherlands compared to the other countries in
this study. Except for the service sector, the energy intensity is well above the average for all
the countries. This is true especially in the commodity sector and the electricity sector. Also
the emission intensity is high, but moderate compared with the energy intensity, because of
the high content of gas in total energy consumption.
7DEOH0DLQLQGLFDWRUVIRUWKH1HWKHUODQGV
7RWDO &RPPR
GLWLHV
6HUYLFHV (OHF
WULFLW\
+RXVH
KROGV
*'30UG86' 305 32 207 6 225
(QHUJ\LQWHQVLW\3-*'3 19.1 8.49 4.77 107.70 1.91
(PLVVLRQLQW0LOOW
&2*'3
0.58 0.47 0.31 8.03 0.09
&RVWSXVKLQGLFDWRU 1.51 1.99 1.18 5.22 5.32
1 The cost-push indicator for households is calculated as the cost-push for total energy use, and cannot be
compared with the indicators for the other sectors
High energy intensities and a relatively flexible production structure, especially in the
electricity sector, implies both that the tax needed to achieve a given reduction in emissions,
and that the total cost-push resulting from a change of demand is small. In terms of costs, the
Netherlands is the least affected among the countries studied here, since the large use of
energy in general opens for a substantial substitution at relatively small changes in relative
prices. According to figure 3.7, the main contribution to emission reductions from the
electricity sector is a reduction in the demand for coal. This flexibility, together with a
relatively low tax, leads to a lower increase of the electricity price than in most of the other
countries. The reduction in demand for electricity is therefore relatively small, which means
that electricity increases its importance in the energy system
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)LJXUH&KDQJHLQWKHGHPDQGIRUHQHUJ\FRPPRGLWLHVE\VHFWRULQWKH1HWKHUODQGV
DVDUHVXOWRIDFDUERQWD[3-
The main difference between the Netherlands and the other countries is the extensive use of
gas. According to figure 3.7, the reductions in the use of gas are substantial, and reflect the
fact that gas has been priced very low. The household sector responds to a tax mainly by
reducing the demand for gas. In the commodity sector, gas contributes to nearly twice as much
of the emission reductions as coal. Also the service sector differs from other countries in the
sense that gas constitutes an important share, although most of the reductions are related to
oil. Due to the impact of gas, however, the emphasis on oil is less dramatic in the Netherlands,
and reflects the fact that emission cuts in the Netherlands are relatively cheap.
)LJXUH$QWLFLSDWHGXQLWFRVWVE\VHFWRUIRUWKH1HWKHUODQGV86'.J
According to figure 3.8 the distribution of anticipated unit costs across sectors exhibits
approximately the same pattern in the Netherlands as in other countries. However, the relative
unit cost of the electricity sector is low compared with other sectors, and is due to the high
content of carbon in electricity production. Due to the seemingly large opportunities for
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energy conservation across the sectors in the Netherlands, the level of the unit costs are lower
than in other countries where the electricity sector is also dependent on coal.
The heavy industry contributes to a large share of the emissions from the commodity sector.
The industry also generates relatively large emissions of HFK, PFK and SF6. For instance, the
Netherlands’ emissions of SF6 contribute to half of the total emissions of SF6 from the six
countries, and ¼ of EU’s total emissions. This adds to the possibilities of low-cost emission
reductions in the Netherlands. On the other hand, the anthropogenic emissions of methane are
small, which means that direct measures in agriculture or in management of waste may not
contribute substantially.
The Netherlands has played an active role in environmental policy processes, including the
making of climate policy, within the EU. One reason for this is that environmental matters
means much to the Dutch people, but also that the environmental problems are severe. The
analysis above provides and additional explanation, namely that the costs of implementing
climate measures are low. This is not evident, since the energy demand is heavily based on
gas, the less pollution intensive of all fossil fuels. However, the intensive use of energy leaves
a considerable room for substitution, and the total effect of an emission target is likely to be
very moderate in the Netherlands. There are also indications that emissions may be reduced at
low costs by alternative means, for instance by reducing the emissions of other gases than CO2
in the commodity sector. Hence, the potential for a successful implementation of
environmental policy is large.
 6SDLQ
Spain belongs to the ‘less rich’ EU countries, and it is expected that they will have a higher
economic growth rate in the years to come than most other EU countries. This affects the
costs of reducing emissions relative to a given base year, for instance 1990, considerably.
When comparing the costs of cuts in the emissions of greenhouse gases with other EU
countries, the expected economic growth in Spain therefore has to be considered as well. In
this section, however, we focus mainly on internal differences and ask whether there are
additional reasons for paying attention to the Spanish economy than the effects of unequal
economic growth.
7DEOH0DLQLQGLFDWRUVIRU6SDLQ
7RWDO &RPPR
GLWLHV
6HUYLFHV (OHF
WULFLW\
+RXVH
KROGV
*'30UG86' 511 174 317 20 409
(QHUJ\LQWHQVLW\3-*'3 6.95 5.57 4.73 36.11 0.85
(PLVVLRQLQW0LOOW
&2*'3
0.47 0.31 0.32 3.42 0.04
&RVWSXVKLQGLFDWRU 2.72 3.52 1.59 13.51 12.99
1) The cost-push indicator for households is calculated as the cost-push for total energy use, and cannot be
compared with the indicators for the other sectors
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Oil contributes to 2/3 of the demand for fossil fuels in Spain. The fossil based electricity
production, which constitutes the major part of the electricity sector, is mainly based on coal-
fired plants. These plants demand more than 80 percent of the consumption of coal in Spain.
Gas fired plants are unusual. In the households, coal contributes to about 3 percent of fossil
fuel demand, and gas to about 12 percent.
As shown in table 3.6, energy and emission intensities are about the same as the average for
the six countries. The energy and emissions intensities of commodity and service sectors are
slightly above the average, while the intensities in the electricity sector and households are
below average. For the electricity sector, this can partly be explained by the high intensities in
some of the other countries, notably Germany, the Netherlands and the UK. But it may also be
due to a relatively high price of electricity in Spain or to a high technical standard. In any case,
the electricity sector in Spain is considered effective as a result. Moreover, Spain is rapidly
increasing its dependence on nuclear power, which has nearly doubled over the last decade,
and contributes at present to more the 1/3 of the electricity supply. The explanation for the
low energy intensity in households is primarily the level of consumption in Spain.
The content of coal in the electricity sector is high, which leads to a considerable change in
the demand for fossil fuels. The reduction in the demand for coal in this sector contributes to
nearly half of the total reduction in energy demand in Spain. This leads to a considerable cost-
push for electricity, although lower than in Germany and the UK. This has important
consequences for the commodity sector, where the use of electricity is high. Since the cost of
electricity increases substantially, the costs of the commodity sector also becomes large.
In Spain too, the service sector has to reduce its emissions mainly by reducing the demand for
oil, but the service sector contributes to a smaller share of total reductions than in other
countries. It might be noted, however, that if we disregard the effects of the price of
electricity, the cost-push in service sector is the second highest among the six countries (after
Italy). This implies that the flexibility of the direct use of fossil fuels is lower in the service
sector in Spain than in other countries. Hence, the transport sector may be more vulnerable to
emission cuts.
)LJXUH&KDQJHLQWKHGHPDQGIRUHQHUJ\FRPPRGLWLHVE\VHFWRULQ6SDLQDVDUHVXOW
RIDFDUERQWD[3-
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A tax leads to a reduction in the demand for coal of between 25 and 35 percent in the Spanish
sectors. Figure 3.9 shows that the major contribution comes from the demand for coal by 130
PJ in the electricity sector, while the demand for oil and gas increases slightly in this sector.
The contribution from the service sector is based on a reduction in the demand for oil, which
leads to a relatively high increase in the cost of the energy aggregate of the sector. The
commodity sector replaces electricity and coal by oil and gas, but the demand decreases for all
energy commodities. In fact, 80 percent of the total reductions in Spain can be explained by
reductions in the demand for coal in the commodity and the electricity sectors, and oil in the
service sector. The low energy intensity explains why the contribution from the household
sector to the emissions is moderate.
The motivation for finding alternative measures to taxes is highest in the commodity sector,
partly due to their dependency of electricity. There may be additional opportunities to improve
the technology in the industry sector, where heavy industry contributes to a large share. On the
other hand, there are no emissions of HFK, PFK and SF6, so the flexibility with respect to
reducing emission of other gases are small in the commodity sector.
As pointed out, parts of the service sector may face high anticipated unit costs. This may be
critical, because the contribution to CO2 emissions from transport is high, nearly 30 percent.
The emission of N2O and CH4 are, however, high compared with the CO2 emissions.
Agriculture contributes to 2/3 of the emissions of nitrous oxide, which is high compared with
other countries. One reason is that the emissions of nitrous oxide from the industry are low,
but there may be available measures in agriculture aiming at reducing these emissions at low
costs.
)LJXUH$QWLFLSDWHGXQLWFRVWRIDFDUERQWD[86'NJ&2
The importance of coal in the electricity sector in Spain clearly provides opportunities to
reduce CO2 emissions by substitution to less emission intensive production, but also leads to a
significant increase in the cost of electricity. Hence, the possibilities, in particular for the
commodity sector, to substitute from emission intensive to less emission intensive use of
energy are limited. However, the service sector’s ability to draw an advantage from this
possibility is limited, due to the impact of transport. In total, Spain is therefore probably
relatively vulnerable to climate policy. In addition, the expected economic growth rate
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represents an obstacle for radical measures against greenhouse gas emissions. To include
Spain in EU’s efforts to perform leadership in climate negotiations therefore represents a
major challenge to the union.
 7KH8QLWHG.LQJGRP
UK’s energy reserves cover coal, oil and gas. The use of energy is distributed relatively
equally between the three energy commodities for the country as a whole. The commodity
sector emphasises the various energy types relatively equally, while each of the other sectors
is dominated by one of the energy carriers. Oil dominates in the service sector for obvious
reasons. 75 percent of the fossil fuel input in the electricity sector is coal, while gas contribute
to nearly 2/3 of the energy use in households. According to the figures in table 3.7, energy and
emission intensities in all the sectors are above the average for the six countries studied here.
The emission intensity for the UK are among the highest in Europe. Due to the dependency of
coal, the CO2 emissions in the electricity sector are high, also with respect to the high energy
intensity.
7DEOH0DLQLQGLFDWRUVIRU8QLWHG.LQJGRP
7RWDO &RPPR
GLWLHV
6HUYLFHV (OHF
WULFLW\
+RXVH
KROGV
*'30UG86' 1009 303 676 30 868
(QHUJ\LQWHQVLW\3-*'3 8.53 6.12 4.58 64.72 1.96
(PLVVLRQLQW0LOOW
&2*'3
0.57 0.36 0.30 5.85 0.10
&RVWSXVKLQGLFDWRU 7.79 10.93 5.79 22.83 22.74
1) Cost-push indicator for the households applies for total energy
The dependency of coal in the UK implies that the level of the tax is higher than average for
the countries focused on in this study. Due to dependency of coal, the cost-push of the tax is
substantial for economy as a whole and in particular for the electricity and household sectors.
However, an expected restructuring of the electricity market in the UK, compared to the
situation in 1994, is likely to bring about a substantial reduction in the emissions from the
electricity sector. In particular, the commodity sector may draw an advantage of this, since the
sector uses approximately equal amounts in each energy carrier. This allows for a relatively
high flexibility of their energy use. This flexibility, combined with high emission intensities,
makes the opportunities to reduce the total cost-push for the commodity sector bright. The
other sectors have to base their adjustments on the energy carrier they use the most, and are
left off with a higher cost-push.
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.LQJGRPDVDUHVXOWRIDFDUERQWD[3-
The contribution to the emission cuts from energy carriers and sectors are shown in figure
3.11. As for many other countries, the major contributions come from oil in the service sector
and coal in the electricity sector. In addition, the reduction in the demand for gas in the
household sector is significant.
The commodity sector anticipates the highest unit cost of emission reductions in the UK, as
seen in figure 3.12. The unit cost for the commodity sector is high, also compared with most
other countries, but only half as high as in Germany. The high levels of the anticipated unit
costs are explained by the high total cost push for these countries in general. However, the
commodity sector in the UK seems to be in a more advantageous situation than the German,
due to a lower dependency of electricity and coal in total. Still, the incentives to search for
new technologies are present, but the opportunity may be fewer than in Germany.
Although the incentives for the electricity sector to replace coal is low from a statistical point
of view, the deregulation of the electricity market has already lead to an improvement of the
effectiveness of the sector. The UK is about to reduce their dependency of coal in general.
One option is to increase the use of gas in the electricity sector. The UK has access to gas
resources both from own territories, and they are close to the gas reserves in other countries.
The emissions from agriculture are relatively low. This imposes some restrictions on the
opportunities to find low-cost alternatives by reducing the emissions of CH4 and N2O. The
emissions of nitrous oxide from industry is, however, very high, and contribute to nearly 90
percent of total N2O emissions in the UK. Combined with outspoken incentives to replace old
technologies, the opportunities to reduce emissions of other gases than CO2 may be bright,
especially since these emissions are not related to electricity prices. Thereby a moderate final
cost of emission cuts may be achieved, and the scepticism towards emission targets within the
commodity sector may therefore not be very widespread.
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$QWLFLSDWHGXQLWFRVWRIDFDUERQWD[86'NJ&2
Alternative opportunities in the service sector are limited. Transport contributes to 20 percent
of the total CO2 emissions, which is on the average for the six countries. However, the
adaptation to taxes by substitution of energy carriers are somewhat better in the UK than in
most of the other countries, since the sector uses more coal and gas than usual.
The dependency of coal in the UK economy might indicate that emission cuts would have
substantial economic consequences, and that the country therefore should be negative to
emission cuts. Apart from Germany, the anticipated cost of a ‘would-be’ carbon tax is high
compared with the other EU countries studied here. However, the UK has much in common
with Germany. The commodity sector is probably capable of adapting to cuts in carbon
emissions without large costs. There are indications that this may be easier in the UK than in
Germany. This may place them in an advantageous position compared with industries in other
countries. A major obstacle for carrying through emission targets is thereby avoided. The
other sectors also anticipate high costs, but for the electricity sector in particular, alternative
modes of production with lower emissions are clearly available. Hence, despite the UK’s
presumed low concern for environmental problems, they may be positive to a collective action
among member states for economic reasons.
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 3RVVLEOHFRQIOLFWVDQGWKHSRWHQWLDOIRU
OHDGHUVKLS
The country studies portray differences in expected costs among countries and among sectors
within countries. These differences point at possible conflicts of interests that may have an
impact on the EU’s ability to take on a leadership role in the further negotiations in the
international climate regime. Although based on economic factors, conflicts may be expressed
as diverging views on seemingly other topics, such as the choice of appropriate measures. In
this section, we will try to point out the relationship between areas of conflicts and the
differences in costs.
A main prerequisite for EU directional leadership is that if conflicts occur, the EU is able to
mitigate and eventually solve them. A second prerequisite is that the conflicts and the way the
conflicts are dealt with are ‘typical’, in the sense that the solutions can be transferred and /or
generalised and applied to other countries. Then, we have a potential for directional
leadership. Thirdly, the EU is, in fact, a directional leader if the other countries adopt the
solutions. This section discusses possible conflicts among different groups and points at
possible means to solve them that may give a potential for directional leadership.
 ,QWHUQDOGLIIHUHQFHV&RQIOLFWVDERXWWKHXVHRIFOLPDWH
PHDVXUHV
Internal conflicts between sectors within countries often relate to the choice of measures.
Charges on emissions of CO2 have been taken as a point of departure for analysing the costs
of emission cuts. It is well known from textbook economics that a tax on emissions enables a
country to achieve an emission target to the lowest possible cost. In practice, however,
environmental taxes are seldom being used. Instead, environmental authorities prefer other
measures, such as direct control. This may be because of practical difficulties in establishing a
tax regime, or simply because a tax regime itself may generate conflicts if the tax-payers
consider it to be unfair or unnecessary. However, the possibility of using alternatives to
charges is limited, in particular in the case of CO2 emissions, because the sources of a large
part of the emissions are very small (individuals, households, small firms). When the sources
of the emissions are small and dispersed, direct measures based on a close follow-up by the
authorities easily becomes too costly to administer. Instead, general incentive mechanisms are
usually preferred.
By the announcement of a carbon tax, the individuals immediately react to how they believe
the cost of the tax will turn out to them. In terms of the calculations presented in the former
section, this is the cost-push. However, the cost-push is not the same as the final cost of a tax,
which emerges from the new equilibrium after the tax has been implemented. Therefore, some
individuals will tend to exaggerate the cost of the tax. According the calculations, this applies
especially to the industry sectors, which to some extent consist of large enterprises, where the
costs of administrating direct measures, agreements etc. are more manageable than in sectors
consisting of many small units. On the other hand, the possibilities of ineffective control are
much greater, and the incentives to avoid charges are thereby higher. This may be due to
asymmetric information and uncertainty about future costs of emissions control. The
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enterprises may give good arguments for avoiding charges. Export industries fear the loss of
competitiveness and warn against capital export. They could argue that charges may prevent
them from investing in research and development and thereby represent an obstacle for
innovation and cleaner processes. From an economic point of view, however, claims that
charges are ‘too expensive’ are often – although not always – really claims that the national
emission target is too ambitious.
There are many possible ways to confuse the connection between emission targets and the
costs of achieving them, e.g. by means of an appropriate tax. A common argument is that the
industry needs a stable framework under which the authorities want them to operate, inter alia
because of the long-term nature of capital based production. They would rather know the
quantity they are allowed to emit in the future than to adapt to an ever-changing charge. In
principle, quotas may be just as effective as charges, but quotas would then have to be
differentiated among activities. To assess the appropriate differentiation is extremely difficult
and the result is, in fact, just as costly to the individuals as taxes. In practice, therefore, quotas
apply only for some, usually large, enterprises.
A combined system with both quotas and charges easily become advantageous for those who
obtain quotas at the expense of those subject to charges. One reason is that all the uncertainty
about the national cost of achieving the target is loaded upon those who pay the charge.
Second, the most significant options to reduce greenhouse gas emissions are often present in
huge, but ineffective industries. A cost-effective strategy then implies that these industries
reduce emissions much more than others. This may represent a considerable opportunity for
lightening the burden of a climate policy to the big enterprises, since they will gain from any
target milder than the cost-effective one, while the authorities may easily regard any quota
stronger than the average as a “heavy burden”.
The conclusion is that the effect of a carbon charge on the production costs in the electricity
sector and the industry sectors are keys to understand internal economic conflicts. These
sectors face higher anticipated costs than the service sector in all the countries, and this may
spur an immediate negative attitude to cost effective solutions. The main difference between
these two sectors is that while the industry sectors face a high anticipated unit cost, the unit
cost in the electricity sectors are very low. Hence, the industry sectors have incentives to
search for new technologies as a result of the emission targets, while the electricity sectors
have low incentives. However, the electricity sectors in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK
are presently undergoing a substantial restructuring, which leads to lower emissions regardless
of climate policy targets. As a consequence, one ought to study the cost-push in the industry
sectors in the light of these changes. Figure 4.1 displays the cost-push for the aggregates in the
industry sectors across countries.
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)LJXUH&RVWSXVKRIDJJUHJDWHVLQWKHLQGXVWU\VHFWRUDFURVVFRXQWULHV
The restructuring of the electricity sectors in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK implies
that the cost-push of the energy aggregate can be lowered considerably. This will also affect
the product price considerably. Further reduction in the cost-push of fossils may lead to
additional savings. By allowing for quotas by voluntary agreements in the industry and
electricity sectors in these three countries, a substantial part of the national cuts may be
achieved, and it may be relatively easy to make the other sectors accept other measures, such
as charges. This applies in particular for the Netherlands, where emissions in all sectors can be
reduced at low costs. Hence, the potential for conflicts related to an ‘unfair’ distribution of
quotas is low.
The picture is quite different in the other three countries. Here, the potential for technological
improvements in the electricity sector seems to be lower. This may increase the motivation for
both the industry and the electricity sectors to obtain more moderate targets, but the trade-off
towards the other sectors and the consequences for the national economy are more tangible. In
Italy and France it may be difficult to increase the relative costs for the service sector in order
to avoid conflicts in the electricity and the industry sector, not at least because of the large
contribution from transport in the service sector. In Spain, the households already pay a very
high price for emission cuts, if imposed by targets. Further reductions may be highly opposed.
As a consequence, the choice of measures in these countries seems to be a more difficult task
than in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK.
The question is then whether or not the EU can facilitate the selection of measures in any way.
From the analysis above it is clear that the selection of measures is vital, but that different
designs will apply for different countries in order to avoid internal conflicts. By this, we know
at least what the EU should not do, which is to try to impose a system of common measures
and instruments across the member states. Instructions about certain measures to be used may
be acceptable for some countries, but are likely to generate conflicts in other countries. The
EU might thereby run the risk of obstructing the achievement of radical targets for the region
as a whole.
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 'LIIHUHQFHVDQGFRQIOLFWVEHWZHHQVHFWRUVDFURVVFRXQWULHV
As pointed out earlier, the differences between sectors across countries measured by the cost-
push indicators exhibit a rather similar pattern to the total cost-push shown in figure 4.1.
Whether a difference between the cost-push of a given sector across countries is a major
source of conflict depends, however, on the degree of international competition of the sector.
It is difficult to distinguish clearly between internationally competing activities and non-
competing activities, especially within the EU. Nevertheless, the different sectors are more or
less exposed to competition from other countries. In general, manufactured goods are often
used to illustrate changes in the competitiveness of an economy. Industry products also
compete to a considerable extent with industries in countries outside the EU. We may
therefore consider the industry sector to be more vulnerable to a loss of competitiveness than
other sectors.
One way to make internal discrimination within a country legitimate is to argue that it is
necessary to avoid a decline in the competitiveness of the national businesses. It was argued
above that the conflicts related to an allocation of quotas that leaves the industry sectors in
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK better off than with a carbon tax, are smaller than in the
other three countries. In France, Italy and Spain the industry sector will probably expect the
costs of emission cuts to be high, both because of the prior effectiveness of electricity
production, and because the authorities have less opportunities in their choice of climate
measures. The industry sectors in the northern countries may draw the advantage of the
opportunity to make an influence on the choice of instrument. This clearly represents a source
of conflict between countries. The industry sectors in the northern countries would achieve
their targets with lower costs, thereby improving their competitiveness relative to that of the
industry sector in the south.
This conclusion rests crucially on the different conditions in the electricity market across
sectors. To put it bluntly, the three northern countries have more opportunities because the
electricity system is emission intensive, and they can deliver their electricity at low prices,
partly due to subsidies. The change in competitiveness thereby is both unfair and inefficient. It
is difficult to point at specific measures taken within countries that could contribute to
mitigate the differences in the cost-push across the sectors of different countries. However, a
development of a common European market for electricity would contribute to mitigate these
differences significantly. This is clearly an issue where a co-ordination of the EU is
advantageous, and would probably also be ahead of many other regions. Provided that the EU
succeeds in establishing a common electricity market, the possibility for taking directional
leadership in climate polity would be improved, and in addition they would probably take
directional leadership in energy policy.
 1DWLRQDOGLIIHUHQFHVDQGFRQIOLFWV
The six countries can be divided into two groups. The ‘low-conflict’ countries include
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, while France, Italy and Spain constitute the ‘high-
conflict’ group. Although the conflicts may be explained by differences in the level of costs of
emission cuts, they are not identical with costs. The conflicts are also a result of the
possibilities available to the authorities to mitigate internal conflicts. The groups identified
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here also correspond reasonably well with positions the countries have taken in climate issues
within the EU, although non-economic factors, such as ‘greenness’, are often considered to be
important to explain these positions. Some reservations should, however, be given for the
Netherlands for which some studies confirm low costs (Kram and Hill, 1996) while others
indicate high costs (Kram, 1998, Capros, 1998). Adding the aspect of conflicts emerging from
economic differences also seems to strengthen the impression from the economic assessments
just mentioned that there is a need for differentiation between the EU countries when it comes
to the commitments related to the Kyoto protocol. Moreover, that the differentiation may be
more related to economic factors than previously believed.
To find acceptable ways to differentiate targets among countries may reduce the potential for
conflicts significantly. Contrary to the world society the EU possesses an institutional
framework that has enabled it to differentiate targets internally. The EU also went further than
any other of the large parties in Kyoto and proposed a 15 percent reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions in 2010 relative to 1990. A prerequisite for this relatively radical proposal was that
the EU managed to agree on an internal differentiation of targets. The proposal, as well as the
differentiation agreed upon after Kyoto, was based on the so-called Triptych-approach
(Phylipsen et al., 1999).  This approach differentiates emission allowances according to three
categories of emissions: Differences in the standard of living, the fuel mix and the
competitiveness of internationally oriented activities. Hence, the Triptych approach is in many
respects based on similar criteria as those discussed in this report. However the aspect of
conflicts is not taken explicitly into account. The same holds for the national levels of energy
prices, which have an important impact on the results of this study.
Whether the respect to possible conflicts would change the distribution of targets for the EU
countries is hard to say, because it is not entirely clear what the assumptions about the
baseline, or emissions without targets in 2010, was. For example, the standard of living
category was used as an argument to give additional emission allowances to the so-called
Cohesion-countries, which include Spain, but it is difficult to say how much this means in
terms of the emission targets. The targets for the six countries are (pct. change from 1990 to
the period 2008-2012)
France    0.0 percent
Germany -21.0 percent
Italy  - 6.5 percent
The Netherlands  - 6.0 percent
Spain  15.0 percent
United Kingdom -12.5 percent
The differentiation agreed upon after Kyoto may mitigate some of the internal conflicts within
the EU, but according to this study there are a number of potential conflicts left. Although the
three “low conflict” countries all will have to reduce their emissions, it is possible that the
huge differences may spur conflicts. On the background of the seemingly small potential for
conflicts, it seems that the Netherlands has achieved a good agreement. This conclusion is
partly based on the low costs of emission cuts calculated for the Netherlands. A reason why
the Netherlands has got a relatively moderate target may be the low price-level of gas in 1990,
which was not explicitly taken into account in the Triptych approach. It is also difficult to
explain why Germany should reduce their emissions nearly twice as much as the UK, but this
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may be due to the ineffective industrial sector in the former DDR, which has not been
analysed into depth here.
For the “high conflict” countries, it appears that Italy’s target is very hard to achieve without
conflicts. Again, the prices of energy may explain why it is difficult for Italy to reduce
emissions without conflicts, while at the same time, the Triptych approach, which emphasises
the energy mix, prescribes cuts at approximately the same level as for the Netherlands. On the
other hand, the most severe conflicts in Spain may be overcome by the allowance of a 15
percent increase in its emissions. The fact that energy prices, which is assumed to be high in
Spain in this analysis, is not explicitly considered in the Triptych approach, indicates that the
differentiation according to the different levels of the standard of living may have been
overemphasised when assessing targets for individual EU countries.
Apart from the fact that differentiation is important to avoid conflicts, one should also be
aware that if it is considered unfair or inappropriate by one of more parties, new and more
serious conflicts might occur as a result. The differentiation of targets within the EU under the
Kyoto protocol will probably contribute to a mitigation of conflicts, although some factors
could probably be emphasised more in order to avoid them. In particular, the different price
levels for energy in various countries do not seem to have been taken sufficiently into account.
More competition in the electricity market may reduce the importance of this aspect, but, on
the other hand, make the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of the present differentiation more visible.
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 &RQFOXGLQJUHPDUNV
The EU has expressed an interest in acting as a leader in climate negotiations. As pointed out
in Gupta and van der Grijp (1998), leadership may be interpreted in different ways, and how
EU leadership is to be understood in this context varies a lot within the EU. In this report, we
have emphasised directional leadership, that is, leadership by example (Underdal, 1994), and
assumed that solution of conflicts within the EU could be used as a model for how conflicts
might be solved. The aim of this paper has been to detect potential conflicts by comparing the
economic consequences of emission cuts in six countries. This is a first step to approach the
leadership issue, but is not sufficient. The realism of EU solutions applied on the world in
general has not been analysed.
Potential conflicts are viewed as a result of differences in the expected costs of emission
reductions. According to the analysis, the six countries focused here divide into two groups.
Germany, the Netherlands and the UK seem to constitute the ‘low-conflict’ group and France,
Italy and Spain constitute the ‘high-conflict’ group. For Germany and the Netherlands, the
costs thereby support their ‘green’ image. However, this is not to say that the German and the
Dutch governments are not ‘greener’ than the other countries. According to this study, cutting
CO2 emissions are less costly in these countries than in the other three, but it does not tell how
much. For example, the Netherlands’ support of a European carbon tax is easily explained by
a concern for climate change, and can hardly be seen as a consequence of their economic
interests.
The EU has met this challenge by differentiating the targets substantially between the member
states to avoid conflicts. The lesson for the world society is perhaps that the differentiation
agreed upon in Kyoto is far from being sufficient, and that there is a room for larger cuts for
the Annex B countries taken together if the targets are differentiated more among countries.
One may, however, seriously ask whether the EU wants to take directional leadership on this
issue. EU was against differentiation in Kyoto. The other side of this coin is that by
differentiating more within the EU, they achieve larger emission cuts, thereby managing to
strengthen their leadership role on the general target issue.
The analysis also shows that it seems to be important for some of the countries, UK in
particular, to discriminate some sectors of the economy where the potential for emission cuts
is large, in order to avoid conflicts. Also the UK’s insisting on the subsidiarity principle
(Dahl, 1998) is thereby supported by the economic consequences. A nationally sovereign
policy can be carried out by a combination of different measures and instruments, adapted to
the circumstances in each country. Sectors with large potentials and strong political influence
will prefer physical targets, while incentives will be preferred for smaller units. Moreover, the
distribution of commitments within such a combined system of measures will have to differ
substantially between countries in order to avoid large conflicts. Therefore, an attempt to
impose common measures across countries may lead to less ambitious targets for the EU as a
whole.
The analysis also demonstrates the vital role played by the electricity sector. A large part of
the differences in costs across the countries focused in this study can be traced back to the
opportunities and the conditions in the electricity sector. As a consequence, a co-ordination of
the electricity market in Europe will make a major contribution to reducing the conflicts
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between countries. This is perhaps the issue where the potential for EU leadership is most
significant, but also very challenging. Previous attempts to approach a common electricity
market in the EU have had little success. This also explains the difficulties in establishing a
common climate policy (Wettestad, 1998). Hence, the key to success for EU leadership on
climate change may be a co-ordination of the electricity market within the Union.
&,&(525HSRUW
Sources of conflicts in climate policy within the EU: An economic analysis
41
 5HIHUHQFHV
Aaheim, H.A. (1998): “Climate Policy with Multiple Sources and Sinks of Greenhouse
Gases”, (QYLURQPHQWDODQG5HVRXUFH(FRQRPLFV in print
Capros, P. (1998): “Economic and Energy System Implications of European CO2 Mitigation
Strategy: Synthesis of Results from Model Based Analysis”, in (FRQRPLF0RGHOOLQJRI
&OLPDWH&KDQJH, OECD Workshop REPORT 17-18 Sept. 1999, OECD, Paris
COHERENCE (1991): &RVWHIIHFWLYHQHVV$QDO\VLVRI&2UHGXFWLRQ2SWLRQV6\QWKHVLV
5HSRUWJOULE CEC DGXII Report.
Dahl, A. (1998): ”Competence and Subsitiarity Perspective: Legal Basis and Political
Realities”, PLPHR, Fridtjof Nansens Insitute, Oslo.
Dean, A. (1993): “What do Global Models Tell us About the Carbon Taxes Required and the
Economic Costs Entailed in Reducing CO2 Emissions?”, in T. Kaya, N. Nakicienovic, W.D.
Nordhaus and F.L. Toth (ed.): &RVWV,PSDFWVDQG%HQHILWVRI&20LWLJDWLRQ, CP-93-2
IIASA, Laxenburg.
Edmonds, J.A., and D.W. Barns (1992): “Factors Affecting the Long Term Cost of Global
Fossil Fuel CO2 emissions Reducions”, ,QWHUQDWLRQDO-RXUQDORI*OREDO(QHUJ\,VVXHV, []
(3), 140-166.
Flavin, C. and Nicholas Lensen (1994): 3RZHU6XUJH*XLGHWRWKH&RPLQJ(QHUJ\
5HYROXWLRQ. World Watch Institute, W.W. Norton & Company. New York, London.
Grubb, M., J. Edmonds, P. ten Brink and M. Morrison (1993): The Costs of Limiting Fossil
Fuel CO2 Emissions: A Survey and Analysis”, $QQXDO5HYLHZRI(QHUJ\DQG(QYLURQPHQW
[], 397-478.
Gupta, J. and van der Grijp (1998):”European Leadership and Climate Change”, PLPHR.
Insituut voor Milieuvraagstukken, Freie Universiteit, Amsterdam.
Kram, T. (1998): ”The Energy Technology Systems Analysis Programme: History, the
ETSAP Kyoto Statement and Post-Kyoto Analysis” in (FRQRPLF0RGHOOLQJRI&OLPDWH
&KDQJH, OECD Workshop REPORT 17-18 Sept. 1999, OECD, Paris
Kram T. and D. Hill (1996): “A Multinational Model for CO2 Reduction”, (QHUJ\3ROLF\ 
(1), 39-51.
Krause, F. and J. Koomey (1996): (QHUJ\3ROLF\LQWKH*UHHQKRXVH vol. two. Internationall
Project for Sustainable Energy Paths IPSEP. El Cerito. Calif.
Manne, A.S. and R.G. Richels (1991): “Global CO2 Emission Reductions - the Impacts of
Rising Energy Costs”, (QHUJ\-RXUQDO´[] (1), 87-107.
&,&(525HSRUW
Sources of conflicts in climate policy within the EU: An economic analysis
42
Nordhaus, W.D. (1993): “Rolling the DICE: An Optimal Transition Path for Controlling
Greenhouse Gases”, 5HVRXUFHDQG(QHUJ\(FRQRPLFV[] (1), 27-50.
Oliveira-Martins, J., Burniaux, J.-M., J.P. Martin, and G. Nicoletti (1992): “The Cost of
Reducing CO2 Emissions: A Comparison of Carbon Tax Curves with GREEN. 2(&'
(FRQRPLF:RUNLQJ3DSHUV, no. 118, Paris.
Peck, S.C. and T.J. Teisberg (1994): “International CO2 Emissions control. An Analysis
Using CETA”, (QHUJ\3ROLF\ [](4/5), 297-308.
Phylipsen, G.J.M., J.W. Bode, K. Blok, H. Merkus and B. Metz (1998):”A Triptych sectors
approach to buden differetiation; GHG emisions in the European bubble”. (QHUJ\3ROLF\ >@
(12), 929-943.
Ringius, L. (1999): ”Differentiation, Leaders and Fairness. Negotiating Climate Commitments
in the European Community”. Forthcoming in ,QWHUQDWLRQDO1HJRWLDWLRQV, 1999, Vol. 4, No.
2.
Underdal, A. (1994): ”Leadership Theory: Rediscovering the Arts of Management” in
,QWHUQDWLRQDO0XOLODWHUDO1HJRWLDWLQJ$SSURDFKHVWRWKH0DQDJHPHQWIR&RPSOH[LW\,
IIASA/Jossey-Bass, SF, 178-197
United Nations’ Enviornmental Programme (1994): 81(3*UHHQKRXVH*DV$EDWHPHQW
&RVWLQJ6WXGLHV3KDVH7ZR5HSRUW3DUW0DLQ5HSRUWUNEP Collaborating Centre on
Energy and Environment. RISØ National Laboratory, Denmark.
Wettestad, J. ”Lessons from the Development of EU Climate Policy:  Differentiate Measures;
Not Only Targets!”, PLPHR, Fridtjof Nansens Institute, Oslo.
CICERO was established by the
Norwegian government in April
1990 as a non-profit organization
associated with the University of
Oslo.
The research concentrates on:
• International negotiations on
climate agreements. The themes
of the negotiations are
distribution of costs and benefits,
information and institutions.
• Global climate and regional
environment effects in
developing and industrialized
countries. Integrated assessments
include sustainable energy use
and production, and optimal
environmental and resource
management.
• Indirect effects of emissions and
feedback mechanisms in the
climate system as a result of
chemical processes in the
atmosphere.
This is CICERO
Contact details:
CICERO
P.O. Box. 1129 Blindern
N-0317 OSLO
NORWAY
Telephone: +47 22 85 87 50
Fax: +47 22 85 87 51
Web: www.cicero.uio.no
E-mail: admin@cicero.uio.no
